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Abstract. We consider the explicit fragment of the basic justification stit
logic introduced in [9]. We define a Hilbert-style axiomatic system for this
logic and show that this system is strongly complete relative to the intended
semantics.
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1 Introduction
Basic justification stit (or jstit, for short) logic was introduced in [9] as an envi-
ronment for analysis of doxastic actions related to proving activity within a somewhat
idealized community of agents. This logic combines expressive means of stit logic by
N. Belnap et al. [4] with those of justification logic by S. Artemov et al. [2]. The two
latter logics provide for the pure agency side and the pure proof ontology side of the
proving activity, respectively, so that it is assumed that doing something is in effect
seeing to it that something is the case, and that every actual proof can be understood
as a realization of some proof polynomial from justification logic. The only missing
element in this picture is then the link between the two components, i.e. how agents
can see to it that a proof is realized. Such a realization may come in different forms,
researchers may, for example, exchange emails or put the proofs they have found on a
common whiteboard. In basic jstit logic this rather common situation is idealized in
that only public proving activity of agents is taken into account. In other words, taking
up the whiteboard metaphor, the agents in question can only participate in proving
activity by putting their proofs on the common whiteboard for everyone to see, and
not by sending one another private messages or scribbling in their private notebooks.
In order to represent the proving activity of agents under the above-described set
of assumptions, basic jstit logic features a set of four new modalities which were called
in [9] proving modalities. Proving modalities capture four different modes in which
one can speak about proving activity of an agent. The idea is that one gets a right
classification of such modes if one intersects the distinction between agentive and factual
(aka moment-determinate) events developed in stit logic with the distinction between
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explicit and implicit modes of knowledge which is central to justification logic. The
first distinction, when applied to proofs, corresponds to a well-known philosophical
discussion of proofs-as-objects vs proofs-as-acts. One refers to a proof-as-act when one
says that agent j proves some proposition A, but one refers to a proof-as-object when
saying that A was proved. While doing that, one can either simply say that A was
proved, or add that A was proved by some proof t; and the difference between these
two modes of speaking is exactly the difference between implicit and explicit reference
to proofs. The resulting classification of proving modalities looks then as follows:
Agentive Moment-determinate
Explicit j proves A by t A has been proven by t
Prove(j, t, A) Proven(t, A)
Implicit j proves A A has been proven
Prove(j, A) Proven(A)
In [9] the semantics of these modalities was presented and informally motivated in
some detail. However, axiomatizing basic jstit logic proved to be an uphill task. The
first partial success was achieved in [7] where an axiomatization of implicit fragment of
basic jstit logic (obtained by omitting the two explicit proving modalities of the above
table) was presented and shown to be complete. In the present paper we focus on
this omitted set of proving modalities and look into what happens when one omits the
implicit proving modalities from the basic jstit logic and keeps the explicit ones. The
resulting system, which will be called here the explicit jstit logic, complements, in a
sense, the implicit jstit logic to the full set of proving modalities. In this paper we will
axiomatize this logic and thus complement the main result of [7] with a similar result
for the explicit proving modalities.
The layout of the rest of the paper is then as follows. In Section 2 we define the
language and the semantics of the logic at hand. We then connect explicit jstit logic
to JA-STIT, the stit logic of justification announcements. JA-STIT was the subject of
some of our earlier papers (see [8]) and is a proper extension of explicit jstit logic in
terms of expressive power. The proof of the main result of the current paper displays
some very close parallels to the completeness proof for JA-STIT given in [8], to the
point that we can re-use a dozen of technical lemmas proven in [8] without altering one
letter in their respective proofs. We also give some facts about expressivity of explicit
jstit logic, namely, we mention the failure finite model properties and show that this
logic, just as JA-STIT, can tell the difference between the general class of its intended
models and the subclass of models based on discrete time.
The strongly complete axiomatization for explicit jstit logic is then presented in
Section 3. We immediately show this system to be sound w.r.t. the semantics intro-
duced in Section 2, and we end the section with a proof for a number of theorems of
the system and a note on an alternative axiomatization of the same set of theorems.
Section 4 then contains the bulk of technical work necessary for the completeness
theorem. It gives a stepwise construction and adequacy check for all the numerous
components of the canonical model and ends with a proof of a truth lemma. This
section displays the highest degree of dependency on lemmas proved in [8] and we give
a table connecting the lemmas of this section to the results of [8]. Section 5 then wraps
up, giving a concise proof of the completeness result, drawing some conclusions and
drafting directions for future work.
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In what follows we will be assuming, due to space limitations, a basic acquaintance
with both stit logic and justification logic. We recommend to peruse [5, Ch. 2] for a
quick introduction to the basics of stit logic, and [1] for the same w.r.t. justification
logic.
2 Basic definitions and notation
2.1 Language
We fix some preliminaries. First we choose a finite set Ag disjoint from all the
other sets to be defined below. Individual agents from this set will be denoted by
letters i and j. Then we fix countably infinite sets PV ar of proof variables (denoted
by x, y, z) and PConst of proof constants (denoted by c, d). When needed, subscripts
and superscripts will be used with the above notations or any other notations to be
introduced in this paper. Set Pol of proof polynomials is then defined by the following
BNF:
t := x | c | s+ t | s× t |!t,
with x ∈ PV ar, c ∈ PConst, and s, t ranging over elements of Pol. In the above
definition + stands for the sum of proofs, × denotes application of its left argument to
the right one, and ! denotes the so-called proof-checker, so that !t checks the correctness
of proof t.
In order to define the set FormAg of formulas we fix a countably infinite set V ar
of propositional variables to be denoted by letters p, q. Formulas themselves will be
denoted by letters A,B,C,D, and the definition of FormAg is supplied by the following
BNF:
A := p | A ∧B | ¬A | [j]A | ✷A | t:A | KA | Prove(j, t, A) | Proven(t, A),
with p ∈ V ar, j ∈ Ag and t ∈ Pol.
It is clear from the above definition of FormAg that we are considering a version of
modal propositional language. As for the informal interpretations of modalities, [j]A
is the so-called cstit action modality and ✷ is the historical necessity modality, both
modalities are borrowed from stit logic. The next two modalities, KA and t:A, come
from justification logic and the latter is interpreted as “t proves A”, whereas the former
is the strong epistemic modality “A is known”.
We assume ✸ and 〈j〉 as notations for the dual modalities of ✷ and [j], respectively.
As usual, ω will denote the set of natural numbers including 0, ordered in the natural
way.
2.2 Semantics
For the language at hand, we assume the following semantics. A justification stit
(jstit, for short) model for a given agent community Ag is a structure of the form:
M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉
such that:
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1. Tree is a non-empty set. Elements of Tree are called moments.
2. ✂ is a partial order on Tree for which a temporal interpretation is assumed. We
will also freely use notations like ☎, ✁, and ✄ to denote the inverse relation and
the irreflexive companions.1
3. Hist is a set of maximal chains in Tree w.r.t. ✂. Since Hist is completely
determined by Tree and ✂, it is not included into the structure of model as a
separate component. Elements of Hist are called histories. The set of histories
containing a given moment m will be denoted Hm. The following set:
MH(M) = {(m,h) | m ∈ Tree, h ∈ Hm},
called the set of moment-history pairs, will be used to evaluate formulas of the
above language.
4. Choice is a function mapping Tree × Ag into 22
Hist
in such a way that for any
given j ∈ Ag and m ∈ Tree we have as Choice(m, j) (to be denoted as Choicemj
below) a partition of Hm. For a given h ∈ Hm we will denote by Choicemj (h) the
element of partition Choicemj containing h.
5. Act is a function mapping MH(M) into 2Pol.
6. R and Re are two pre-order on Tree giving two versions of epistemic accessibility
relation. They are assumed to be connected by inclusion R ⊆ Re.
7. E is a function mapping Tree × Pol into 2Form
Ag
called admissible evidence
function.
8. V is an evaluation function, mapping the set V ar into 2MH(M).
A structure of the above described type is admitted as a jstit model iff it satisfies
the following list of additional constraints. In order to facilitate their exposition, we
introduce a couple of useful notations first. For a given m ∈ Tree and any given
h, g ∈ Hm we stipulate that:
Actm :=
⋂
h∈Hm
Act(m,h); Act(m,h,j) :=
⋂
g∈Choicemj (h)
Act(m, g);
and:
h ≈m g ⇔ (∃m
′
✄m)(h, g ∈ Hm′).
Whenever we have h ≈m g, we say that h and g are undivided at m.
We then demand satisfaction of the following constraints by the jstit models:
1. Historical connection:
(∀m,m1 ∈ Tree)(∃m2 ∈ Tree)(m2 ✂m ∧m2 ✂m1).
1A more common notation ≤ is not convenient for us since we also widely use ≤ in this paper to
denote the natural order relation between elements of ω.
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2. No backward branching:
(∀m,m1,m2 ∈ Tree)((m1 ✂m ∧m2 ✂m)⇒ (m1 ✂m2 ∨m2 ✂m1)).
3. No choice between undivided histories:
(∀m ∈ Tree)(∀h, h′ ∈ Hm)(h ≈m h
′ ⇒ Choicemj (h) = Choice
m
j (h
′))
for every j ∈ Ag.
4. Independence of agents:
(∀m ∈ Tree)(∀f : Ag → 2Hm)((∀j ∈ Ag)(f(j) ∈ Choicemj )⇒
⋂
j∈Ag
f(j) 6= ∅).
5. Monotonicity of evidence:
(∀t ∈ Pol)(∀m,m′ ∈ Tree)(Re(m,m
′)⇒ E(m, t) ⊆ E(m′, t)).
6. Evidence closure properties. For arbitrarym ∈ Tree, s, t ∈ Pol andA,B ∈ FormAg
it is assumed that:
(a) A→ B ∈ E(m, s) ∧ A ∈ E(m, t)⇒ B ∈ E(m, s× t);
(b) E(m, s) ∪ E(m, t) ⊆ E(m, s+ t).
(c) A ∈ E(m, t)⇒ t : A ∈ E(m, !t);
7. Expansion of presented proofs:
(∀m,m′ ∈ Tree)(m′ ✁m⇒ ∀h ∈ Hm(Act(m
′, h) ⊆ Act(m,h))).
8. No new proofs guaranteed:
(∀m ∈ Tree)(Actm ⊆
⋃
m′✁m,h∈Hm
(Act(m′, h))).
9. Presenting a new proof makes histories divide:
(∀m ∈ Tree)(∀h, h′ ∈ Hm)(h ≈m h
′ ⇒ (Act(m,h) = Act(m,h′))).
10. Future always matters:
✂ ⊆ R.
11. Presented proofs are epistemically transparent:
(∀m,m′ ∈ Tree)(Re(m,m
′)⇒ (Actm ⊆ Actm′)).
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We offer some intuitive explanation for the above-defined notion of jstit model. Due
to space limitations, we only explain the intuitions behind jstit models very briefly, and
we urge the reader to consult [9, Section 3] for a more comprehensive explanations,
whenever needed.
The components like Tree, ✂, Choice and V are inherited from stit logic, whereas
R, Re and E come from justification logic. The only new component is Act which
represents the above-mentioned common pool of proofs demonstrated to the community
at any given moment under a given history. When interpreting Act, we invoke the
classical stit distinction between dynamic (agentive) and static (moment-determinate)
entities, assuming that the presence of a given proof polynomial t on the community
whiteboard only becomes an accomplished fact at m when t is present in Act(m,h)
for every h ∈ Hm. On the other hand, if t is in Act(m,h) only for some h ∈ Hm this
means that t is rather in a dynamic state of being presented, rather than being present,
to the community.
The numbered list of semantical constraints above then just builds on these in-
tuitions. Constraints 1–4 are borrowed from stit logic, constraints 5 and 6 are in-
herited from justification logic. Constraint 7 just says that nothing gets erased from
the whiteboard, constraint 8 says a new proof cannot spring into existence as a static
(i.e. moment-determinate) feature of the environment out of nothing, but rather has
to come as a result (or a by-product) of a previous activity. Constraint 9 is just a
corollary to constraint 3 in the richer environment of jstit models, constraint 10 says
that the possible future of the given moment is always epistemically relevant in this
moment, and constraint 11 says that the community knows everything that has firmly
made its way onto the whiteboard.
Right away we establish some elementary facts about jstit models to be used in
what follows:
Lemma 1. Let M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉 be a jstit model. Then:
1. (∀m ∈ Tree)(∀h ∈ Hm)({m1 ∈ Tree | m1 ✂m} ⊆ h);
2. (∀m ∈ Tree)(∀h, g ∈ Hm)(h 6= g ⇒ (∃m
′′ ✄m)(h ∈ Hm′′));
3. (∀m,m′ ∈ Tree)(m✂m′ ⇒ Hm′ ⊆ Hm).
Proof. (Part 1). We clearly have m ∈ h. Consider an arbitrarym1✁m. Then h∪{m1}
must be an ✂-chain. Indeed, if m′ ∈ h then either m ✂m′ or m′ ✁m. In the former
case we get m1 ✂m
′ by transitivity of ✂, in the latter case we get m1 ✂m
′ ∨m′ ✂m1
by the absence of backward branching. But since h is a maximal chain, this means
that we must have m1 ∈ h.
(Part 2). To obtain a contradiction, assume that h, g ∈ Hm are different, but we
have:
(∀m′′ ✄m)(h /∈ Hm′′). (1)
Given that every two elements of hmust be✂-comparable, this means that h ⊆ {m1 ∈ Tree | m1✂m}
and, by Part 1, that h = {m1 ∈ Tree | m1 ✂m}. Note that Part 1 also entails that
g ⊇ {m1 ∈ Tree | m1 ✂m}, so that in this case we must have g ⊇ h. We can have
neither g ⊃ h, since this would violate the maximality of h, nor g = h, since this is in
contradiction with our assumption. Therefore, (1) must be false.
(Part 3). Immediately by the absence of backward branching.
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For the members of FormAg , we will assume the following inductively defined
satisfaction relation. For every jstit model M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉
and for every (m,h) ∈MH(M) we stipulate that:
M,m, h |= p⇔ (m,h) ∈ V (p);
M,m, h |= [j]A⇔ (∀h′ ∈ Choicemj (h))(M,m, h
′ |= A);
M,m, h |= ✷A⇔ (∀h′ ∈ Hm)(M,m, h
′ |= A);
M,m, h |= KA⇔ ∀m′∀h′(R(m,m′)&h′ ∈ Hm′ ⇒M,m
′, h′ |= A);
M,m, h |= t:A⇔ A ∈ E(m, t)&(∀m′ ∈ Tree)(∀h′ ∈ Hm′)(Re(m,m
′)⇒M,m′, h′ |= A);
M,m, h |= Prove(j, t, A)⇔ t ∈ Act(m,h,j)&M,m, h |= t:A&t /∈ Actm;
M,m, h |= Proven(t, A)⇔ t ∈ Actm&M,m, h |= t:A
In the above clauses we assume that p ∈ V ar; we also assume standard clauses for
Boolean connectives.
Explicit jstit logic is closely connected to JA-STIT, the stit logic of justification an-
nouncement. In JA-STIT the two proving modalities of explicit jstit logic are replaced
with a single modality Et for t ∈ Pol, with the following semantics:
M,m, h |= Et⇔ t ∈ Act(m,h).
Since JA-STIT is interpreted over the same class of models as basic jstit logic, it
turns out that one can retrieve the explicit proving modalities in JA-STIT using the
following definitions:
Prove(j, t, A) =df [j]Et ∧✸¬Et ∧ t:A; Proven(t, A) =df ✷Et ∧ t:A.
On the other hand, it is easy to show that Et cannot be defined in explicit jstit logic,
so that JA-STIT is its proper extension. Despite the difference in expressive powers,
it was possible to borrow many constructions and lemmas for the main result of this
paper directly from the completeness proof for JA-STIT without any modifications at
all.
We observe that even though all elements of FormAg are interpreted over moment-
history pairs, for some of them their evaluations are obviously independent from the
history component:
Lemma 2. For every agent community Ag, every A ∈ FormAg and every t ∈ Pol,
all of the formulas ✷A, KA, t:A and Proven(t, A) are moment-determinate, that is
to say, if α ∈ {✷A,KA, t:A,Proven(A)}, then for an arbitrary jstit model
M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉, arbitrary m ∈ Tree and h, h′ ∈ Hm we have:
M,m, h |= α⇔M,m, h′ |= α.
Also, Boolean combinations of these formulas are moment-determinate.
Proof. For α ∈ {✷A,KA, t:A} it suffices to note that their respective satisfaction
conditions at a given (m,h) ∈ MH(M) in a given M have no free occurrences of
h. When we turn, further, to the corresponding condition for Proven(t, A), the only
free occurrence of h will be within the context M,m, h |= t:A which was shown to be
moment-determinate.
Of course, Boolean combinations of moment-determinate formulas must be moment-
determinate, too.
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It follows from Lemma 2 that we might as well omit the histories when discussing
satisfaction of such formulas and write M,m |= KA instead of M,m, h |= KA, etc.
One can in principle simplify the above semantics by introducing the additional
constraint that Re ⊆ R. This leads to a collapse of the two epistemic accessibility
relation into one. Therefore, we will call jstit models satisfying Re ⊆ R unirelational
jstit models. It is known that such a simplification in the context of pure justification
logic does not affect the set of theorems (see, e.g. [6] and [2, Comment 6.5]), and we
have shown in [8] that this is also the case for JA-STIT. The main result of this paper
will show that also in this respect the explicit jstit logic follows the suit. In fact, the
canonical model to be constructed in our completeness proof below is unirelational. In
view of this, we offer some comments as to the simplifications of semantics available in
the unirelational setting.
We observe that one can equivalently define a unirelational jstit model as a structure
M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R, E , V 〉 satisfying all the constraints for the jstit models,
except that in the numbered constraints one substitutes R for Re. Also, in the context
of unirelational jstit models, it is possible to simplify the satisfation clause for t:A as
follows:
M,m, h |= t:A⇔ A ∈ E(m, t)&M,m, h |= KA.
2.3 Concluding remarks
Before we start with the task of axiomatizing the explicit jstit logic, we briefly
mention some facts about its expressive powers which are relevant to our chosen format
of completeness proof. Firstly, it is worth noting that under the presented semantics
some satisfiable formulas cannot be satisfied over finite models, or even over infinite
models where all histories are finite. The argument for this is the same as in implicit
fragment of basic jstit logic, for which this claim was proved in [7] usingK(✸p∧✸¬p) as
an example of a formula which is satisfiable over jstit models but not over jstit models
with finite histories. This already rules out some methods of proving completeness like
filtration method.
Second, we mention that, just like JA-STIT, explicit jstit logic has enough ex-
pressive power to tell the difference between the general class of jstit models and its
subclass of jstit models based on discrete time. To be more precise, we define that a
jstit modelM is based on discrete time iff every chain in Hist(M) is isomorphic to an
initial segment of ω, the set of natural numbers. Then it can be shown that:
Proposition 1. Let Ag be an agent community. The subset of FormAg-validities over
the class of (unirelational) jstit models for Ag is a proper subset of the set of FormAg-
validities over the class of (unirelational) jstit models for the same community based
on discrete time.
Proof. We fix an arbitrary agent community Ag. We clearly have the subset relation.
As for the properness part, consider the following formula:
A := K(¬Proven(x, p) ∨ Proven(y, q))→ (¬Prove(j, x, p)∨
∨ (y :q → (Proven(y, q) ∨ Prove(j, y, q))),
with x, y ∈ PV ar, p ∈ V ar, and j ∈ Ag. We show that A is not valid over the class of
all unirelational jstit models (hence not valid over the class of all jstit models either).
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Consider the following unirelational modelM = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R, E , V 〉 for the
community Ag:
• Tree = {a,−1} ∪ {r ∈ R | 0 ≤ r < 1};
• ✂ = {(0, a), (−1, a), (a, a)} ∪ {(r, r′) | r, r′ ∈ R ∩ Tree, r ≤ r′};
• R = ✂;
• E(m, t) = FormAg, for all m ∈ Tree and t ∈ Pol.
• V (p) = V (q) = MH(M), V (p′) = ∅ for all p′ ∈ V ar \ {p, q}.
It is straightforward to see that the above-defined components of M satisfy all the
constraints imposed on normal jstit models except possibly those involving Choice and
Act.2 Note that, among other things, we will have, under the above settings, that:
M,m |= x:p ∧ y :q (2)
for all m ∈ Tree. Before we go on and define the remaining components, let us
pause a bit and reflect on the structure of histories in the model M that is being
defined. We only have two histories in it, one is h1 = {−1, 0, a} and the other is
h2 = {−1} ∪ {r ∈ R | 0 ≤ r < 1}. So we define:
Choicemi =
{
Hm, if i 6= j or m 6= 0;
{{h1}, {h2}}, if i = j and m = 0.
Act(m,h) =


{x, y}, if m ∈ R and m > 0;
{x}, if m = 0 and h = h2;
∅, otherwise.
Again, most of the constraints on jstit models are now easily seen to be satisfied. The
no new proofs guaranteed constraint is perhaps less straightforward, so we consider it
in some detail. We have, on the one hand, Actm = ∅, whenever m ∈ {−1, 0, a} so
neither of these moments can falsify the constraint. The only remaining option is that
m ∈ {r ∈ R | 0 < r < 1}, say m = r. But then the only history passing through r is h2
and we have, on the other hand, r2 ∈ Tree,
r
2 < r, and Act(
r
2 , h2) = Act(r, h2) = Actr
so that the no new proofs guaranteed constraint is again verified.
Now, consider 0 ∈ Tree. The set of its epistemic alternatives is Tree \ {−1}.
We have all of the following: Choice0j(h2) = {h2}, x ∈ Act(0, h2), H0 = {h1, h2},
x /∈ Act(0, h1), and y /∈ Act(0, h2). In virtue of all this and by (2), we obtain that:
M, 0, h2 |= Prove(j, x, p) ∧ y :q ∧ ¬Prove(j, y, q) ∧ ¬Proven(y, q). (3)
On the other hand, if m ∈ Tree and h ∈ Hm, then either m ∈ {r ∈ R | 0 < r < 1} or
m is outside of this set. In the former case we have Hm = {h2}, whence Actm = {x, y}
so that, by (2), we get:
M,m, h |= Proven(y, q),
2It is also easy to see that M is CS-normal for any possible constant specification CS as defined
in the next section. Therefore, Proposition 1 persists when one restricts attention to a class of jstit
models normal relative to a constant specification.
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for all h ∈ Hm. In the latter case we have Actm = ∅, which means that we must also
have:
M,m, h |= ¬Proven(x, p),
for all h ∈ Hm. So, in any case, the formula ¬Proven(x, p) ∨ Proven(y, q) gets to be
satisfied throughout all of the moment-history pairs in M, which further means that:
M, 0, h2 |= K(¬Prove(j, x, p) ∨ Prove(j, y, q))
is satisfied. Adding the latter with (3), we see that (0, h2) falsifies A in M.
On the other hand, A is valid in the class of jstit models based on discrete time
(hence also over unirelational jstit models based on discrete time). In order to show
this, we will assume its invalidity and obtain a contradiction. Indeed, let
M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉 be a jstit model based on discrete time such
that M,m, h 6|= A. Then we will have both
M,m, h |= K(¬Proven(x, p) ∨ Proven(y, q)), (4)
and
M,m, h |= Prove(j, x, p) ∧ y :q ∧ ¬Prove(j, y, q) ∧ ¬Proven(y, q). (5)
Note that the failure of Proven(y, q) combined with satisfaction of y :q shows that we
cannot have y ∈ Actm. On the other hand, the failure of Prove(j, y, q) at (m,h) leaves
us with the following options:
(M,m, h 6|= y :q) ∨ y ∈ Actm ∨ (∃g ∈ Choice
m
j (h))(y /∈ Act(m, g)).
Thus we know that for some h′ ∈ Choicemj (h) we will have y /∈ Act(m,h
′). Also, note
that for any such h′ we will have Choicemj (h
′) = Choicemj (h). Adding this up with the
satisfaction of Prove(j, x, p) at (m,h), we get that one can choose an h′ ∈ Choicemj (h)
in such a way that the following holds:
y /∈ Act(m,h′)&(M,m, h′ |= Prove(j, x, p) ∧ y :q). (6)
By Lemma 2 and (4), we also know that for such h′ we will have:
M,m, h′ |= K(¬Proven(x, p) ∨ Proven(y, q)), (7)
Next, we observe that since (m,h′) satisfies Prove(j, x, p), we know that x ∈ Act(m,h′)
and also that there is a g ∈ Hm such that x /∈ Act(m, g). This shows that we must
have h′ 6= g, and, by Lemma 1.2, this means m must have ✁-successors along h′. Since
M is based on discrete time, consider embedding f of h′ into an initial segment of ω.
Suppose that f(m) = n. We have established that m is not the ✂-last moment along
h′, so there must be an m′ ∈ h′ such that f(m′) = n+1. By the embedding properties
of f , this means that m✁m′ and for no m′′ ∈ Tree it is true that m✁m′′✁m′. By the
future always matters constraint, we know that R(m,m′), therefore, by (7) we must
have:
M,m′, h′ |= ¬Proven(x, p) ∨ Proven(y, q). (8)
On the other hand, let g ∈ Hm′ be arbitrary. Then, by Lemma 1.3, g ∈ Hm, and,
moreover, g ≈m h′. Therefore, by the presenting a new proof makes histories divide
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constraint, we must have Act(m, g) = Act(m,h′). By (6) we know that x ∈ Act(m,h′),
which means that also x ∈ Act(m, g). Since g ∈ Hm′ was chosen arbitrarily, the
latter means that x ∈
⋂
g∈Hm′
(Act(m, g)), and, by the expansion of presented proofs
constraint, x ∈ Actm′ . Further, it follows from (6) that:
M,m, h′ |= x:p. (9)
Given that R ⊆ Re, we must have Re(m,m′), whence by the monotonicity of evidence
and the pre-order properties of Re we further obtain that:
M,m′, h′ |= x:p. (10)
Since we know that x ∈ Actm′ , (10) immediately leads to:
M,m′, h′ |= Proven(x, p). (11)
Whence, in view of (8), it follows that
M,m′, h′ |= Proven(y, q). (12)
The latter means that y ∈ Actm′ , and by the no new proofs guaranteed constraint, it
follows that for some g ∈ Hm′ and some m′′ ∈ g such that m′′ ✁ m′, we must have
y ∈ Act(m′′, g). Now, if m′′ ✁m′, then m′′ ✂m, since m′ was chosen as the immediate
✁-successor of m along h′. The latter means, by the expansion of presented proofs,
that y ∈ Act(m, g). Since, as we have shown above, g ≈m h′, this means, by the
presenting a new proof makes histories divide constraint, that Act(m, g) = Act(m,h′)
and, further, that y ∈ Act(m,h′). The latter is in obvious contradiction with (6).
The obtained contradiction shows that A is valid over the class of jstit models based
on discrete time, so that it must also be valid over its unirelational subclass.
3 Axiomatic system and soundness
Throughout this section, and the next one, we are going to let Ag serve as a constant
denoting arbitrary but fixed agent community. We consider the Hilbert-style axiomatic
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system Π with the following set of axiomatic schemes:
A full set of axioms for classical propositional logic (A0)
S5 axioms for ✷ and [j] for every j ∈ Ag (A1)
✷A→ [j]A for every j ∈ Ag (A2)
(✸[j1]A1 ∧ . . . ∧✸[jn]An)→ ✸([j1]A1 ∧ . . . ∧ [jn]An) (A3)
(s:(A→ B)→ (t:A→ (s× t):B) (A4)
t:A→ (!t:(t:A) ∧KA) (A5)
(s:A ∨ t:A)→ (s+ t):A (A6)
S4 axioms for K (A7)
KA→ ✷K✷A (A8)
Prove(j, t, A)→ (¬Proven(t, A) ∧ [j]Prove(j, t, A) ∧ ¬✷Prove(j, t, A) ∧ t:A) (B9)
(Prove(j, t, A) ∧ t:B)→ Prove(j, t, B) (B10)
Proven(t, A)→ (KProven(t, A) ∧ t:A) (B11)
(Proven(t, A) ∧ t:B)→ Proven(t, B) (B12)
¬Prove(j, t, A)→ 〈j〉(
∧
i∈Ag
¬Prove(i, t, A)) (B13)
The assumption is that in (A3) j1, . . . , jn are pairwise different.
To this set of axiom schemes we add the following rules of inference:
From A,A→ B infer B; (R1)
From A infer KA; (R2)
From KA→ (¬Proven(t1, B1) ∨ . . . ∨ ¬Proven(tn, Bn))
infer KA→ (
∧
j∈Ag
¬Prove(j, t1, B1) ∨ . . . ∨
∧
j∈Ag
¬Prove(j, tn, Bn)). (S4)
The different notation styles present in the above sets of axioms and inference rules are
meant to underscore that the axioms (A0)–(A8) and rules (R1), (R2) are shared by
Π with other axiomatizations for logics combining justification and stit modalities, in-
cluding the axiomatization of the implicit jstit logic given in [7] and the axiomatization
of JA-STIT given in [8].
A standard way to obtain extensions of Π is by adding to it constant specifications,
which basically ensure that one has enough pre-assigned proofs for the axioms of this
system. More precisely, a constant specification is a set CS such that:
• CS ⊆ {cn : . . . c1 :A | c1, . . . , cn ∈ PConst, A an instance of (A0)−(A8), (B9)−(B13)};
• Whenever cn+1 :cn : . . . c1 :A ∈ CS, then also cn : . . . c1 :A ∈ CS.
A given constant specification can be added to Π by appending the following inference
rule (RCS) to its set of rules:
If cn : . . . c1 :A ∈ CS, infer cn : . . . c1 :A. (RCS)
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The resulting axiomatic system is then called Π(CS). Note that ∅ is clearly one example
of constant specification and that we have Π(∅) = Π. Whenever CS 6= ∅, the system
Π(CS) ends up proving some formulas which are not valid over the class of jstit models.
Nevertheless, restriction on jstit models which comes with a commitment to a given
CS is relatively straightforward to describe. We say that a jstit modelM is CS-normal
iff it is true that:
(∀c ∈ PConst)(∀m ∈ Tree)({A | c:A ∈ CS} ⊆ E(m, c)),
where E is theM’s admissible evidence function. Again, it is easy to see that the class
of ∅-normal jstit models is just the whole class of jstit models so that the representation
Π(∅) = Π does not place any additional restrictions on the class of intended models of
Π.
For a given constant specification CS, we define that a proof in Π(CS) as a finite
sequence of formulas such that every formula in it is either an instance of one of the
schemes (A0)–(A8), (B9)–(B12) or is obtained from earlier elements of the sequence by
one of the inference rules (R1),(R2), (RCS), (S4). A proof is a proof of its last formula.
If an A ∈ FormAg is provable in Π(CS), we will write ⊢CS A. We say that Γ ⊆ FormAg
is CS-inconsistent iff for some A1, . . . , An ∈ Γ we have ⊢CS (A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An)→ ⊥, and
we say that Γ is CS-consistent iff it is not CS-inconsistent. Γ is CS-maxiconsistent iff
it is CS-consistent and no CS-consistent subset of FormAg properly extends Γ.
We observe that this definition allows for the standard operations with consistent
and maxiconsistent sets. Namely, every CS-consistent set Γ can be extended to a CS-
maxiconsistent set ∆ ⊇ Γ, and CS-maxiconsistent sets are regular relative to the propo-
sitional connectives in that for every CS-maxiconsistent set Γ and all A,B ∈ FormAg
all of the following holds:
• Exactly one element of {A,¬A} is in Γ.
• A ∨B ∈ Γ iff (A ∈ Γ or B ∈ Γ).
• If A, (A→ B) ∈ Γ, then B ∈ Γ.
• A ∧B ∈ Γ iff (A ∈ Γ and B ∈ Γ).
Our goal is now to obtain, for any given constant specification CS, a strong com-
pleteness theorem for Π(CS), and we start by establishing some soundness claims:
Theorem 1. Let CS be an arbitrary constant specification and let A ∈ FormAg be
such that ⊢CS A. Then A is valid over the class of CS-normal jstit models.
Proof. Given the above notion of proof, it is sufficient to show that every instance
of (A0)–(A8), (B9)–(B12) is valid over the class of CS-normal jstit models and that
every application of rules (R1), (R2), (RCS), and (S4) to formulas which are valid over
the class of CS-normal jstit models yields a formula which is valid over the class of
CS-normal jstit models.
First, note that if M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉 is a normal jstit model,
then 〈Tree,✂, Choice, V 〉 is a model of stit logic. Therefore, axioms (A0)–(A3),
which were copy-pasted from the standard axiomatization of dstit logic3 must be
3See, e.g. [4, Ch. 17], although Π uses a simpler format closer to that given in [3, Section 2.3].
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valid. Second, note that if M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉 is a normal jstit
model, then M = 〈Tree,R,Re, E , V 〉 is what is called in [2, Section 6] a justifica-
tion model4. This means that also all of the (A4)–(A7) must be valid, given that all
of them were borrowed from the standard axiomatization of justification logic. The
validity of other axioms will be motivated below in some detail. In what follows,
M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉 will always stand for an arbitrary CS-normal
jstit model, and (m,h) for an arbitrary element of MH(M).
As for (A8), assume for reductio that M,m, h |= KA ∧ ✸K✸¬A. Then (using
Lemma 2 to omit the histories) M,m |= KA and also M,m |= K✸¬A. By reflexivity
of R, it follows that ✸¬A will be satisfied at m inM. The latter means that, for some
h′ ∈ Hm, A must fail at (m,h′) and therefore, again by reflexivity of R, KA must fail
at m in M, a contradiction.
Consider (B9) and assume that M,m, h |= Prove(j, t, A). Then t /∈ Actm, which
immediately implies that:
M,m, h 6|= Proven(t, A). (13)
Next, we must have, just by the satisfaction of Prove(j, t, A), that:
M,m |= t:A. (14)
Further, note that for every g ∈ Choicemj (h) we will have Choice
m
j (g) = Choice
m
j (h), so
that for every such g we will have t ∈ Act(m,g,j). Adding this up with (14) and the fact
that t /∈ Actm, we get that Prove(j, t, A) is satisfied at (m, g) for every g ∈ Choicemj (h),
or, in other words, that we have:
M,m, h |= [j]Prove(j, t, A). (15)
Finally, given t /∈ Actm, consider h′ ∈ Hm such that t /∈ Act(m,h′). Given that
h′ ∈ Choicemj (h
′), we know that t /∈ Act(m,h′,j), which means that Prove(j, t, A) fails
at (m,h′) so that,in view of h′ ∈ Hm, we get:
M,m, h |= ¬✷Prove(j, t, A). (16)
Summing up (13)–(16), we see that (B9) is satisfied at (m,h).
As for (B10), assume that Prove(j, t, A) ∧ t:B is satisfied at (m,h). By the satis-
faction of the first conjunct we get that t ∈ Act(m,h,j)&t /∈ Actm, which, together with
the satisfaction of t:B, yields that M,m, h |= Prove(j, t, B).
Next we consider (B11). Assuming that M,m, h |= Proven(t, A), we immediately
get that:
t ∈ Actm (17)
and that:
M,m |= t:A. (18)
Assume that m′ ∈ Tree is such that R(m,m′). Then we must have:
M,m′ |= t:A (19)
4The format for the variable assignment V is slightly different, but this is of no consequence for
the present setting.
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by (17) and R ⊆ Re, and we must also have:
t ∈ Actm′ (20)
by the epistemic transparency of presented proofs. Thus we will haveM,m′ |= Proven(t, A)
for an arbitrary R-successor m′ of m, which means, by definition, that we will have:
M,m |= KProven(t, A). (21)
Taken together, (18) and (21) show that (B11) is satisfied at (m,h).
As for (B12), assume that Proven(t, A) ∧ t:B is satisfied at m. By the satisfaction
of the first conjunct we get that t ∈ Actm, which together with the satisfaction of t:B
yields that M,m, h |= Proven(t, B).
The last axiomatic scheme is (B13). Assume that Prove(j, t, A) fails at (m,h).
This can happen for different reasons, therefore, we have to distinguish between three
cases:
Case 1. M,m, h 6|= t:A. Then, by the validity of (B9) we must have
M,m, h |=
∧
i∈Ag ¬Prove(i, t, A). Given that h ∈ Choice
m
j (h), we further obtain that
M,m, h |= 〈j〉
∧
i∈Ag ¬Prove(i, t, A), and the axiom is satisfied.
Case 2. M,m, h |= t:A and t ∈ Actm. Then we must haveM,m, h |= Proven(t, A)
and, again by (B9), we must have M,m, h |=
∧
i∈Ag ¬Prove(i, t, A). Reasoning as in
Case 1, we again see that the axiom is satisfied.
Case 3. M,m, h |= t:A and t /∈ Actm. But then, given the failure of Prove(j, t, A)
at (m,h), there must be some h′ ∈ Choicemj (h) such that t /∈ Act(m,h
′). Notice that
we will have then h′ ∈ Choicemi (h
′) for every i ∈ Ag. Therefore, for every i ∈ Ag
we will have t /∈ Act(m,h′,i), whence it follows that M,m, h
′ |=
∧
i∈Ag ¬Prove(i, t, A).
Since h′ ∈ Choicemj (h), this further means that M,m, h |= 〈j〉
∧
i∈Ag ¬Prove(i, t, A),
and the axiom is satisfied.
Taking up the rules of inference, we immediately see that (R1) and (R2) can only
return CS-validities when given another CS-validities as premises. As for (RCS), assume
that B = cn+1 :cn : . . . c1 :A ∈ CS. We argue by induction on n ≥ 0.
Basis. If n = 0 then B = c1 :A ∈ CS. Since M is CS-normal, this means that
A ∈ E(m, c1). Also A must be an instance of one of the above axiomatic schemes
which were all shown to be CS-validities above, which means that A must hold at
every moment-history pair in M, including the pairs where the moment is some Re-
successor of m. Therefore, we must have M,m, h |= c1 :A = B.
Induction step. n = k + 1. Then B = ck+2 :ck+1 : . . . c1 :A ∈ CS. By defini-
tion of constant specifications, we will also have then ck+1 : . . . c1 :A ∈ CS. By in-
duction hypothesis, we know that ck+1 : . . . c1 :A is a CS-validity, hence must hold in
every moment-history pair of M, including those pairs where the moment is some Re-
successor of m. By CS-normality of M we also know that ck+1 : . . . c1 :A ∈ E(m, ck+2),
which shows that M,m, h |= B.
The hardest part is to show the soundness of the rule (S4). Assume that
KA→ (¬Proven(t1, B1)∨ . . .∨¬Proven(tn, Bn)) is valid over CS-normal jstit models,
and assume also that for some CS-normal jstit modelM = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉
and for some (m,h) ∈MH(M) we have:
M,m, h |= KA ∧ (
∨
j∈Ag
Prove(j, t1, B1) ∧ . . . ∧
∨
j∈Ag
Prove(j, tn, Bn)). (22)
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Then we can choose j1, . . . , jn in such a way that we have:
M,m, h |= KA ∧ (Prove(j1, t1, B1) ∧ . . . ∧ Prove(jn, tn, Bn)). (23)
By the definition of satisfaction relation, we obtain that:
M,m, h |= t1 :B1 ∧ . . . ∧ tn :Bn. (24)
The latter basically means two things:
B1 ∈ E(m, t1), . . . , Bn ∈ E(m, tn). (25)
and
(∀m0 ∈ Tree)(∀h0 ∈ Hm0)(Re(m,m0)⇒M,m0, h0 |= B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bn). (26)
On the other hand, we obtain from (23), also by the definition of satisfaction relation
and h ∈ Choicemj (h), that:
t1, . . . , tn ∈ Act(m,h). (27)
We also know that we can choose a g ∈ Hm such that t1 /∈ Act(m, g). This means that
h 6= g. By Lemma 1.2, it follows that we can choose an m′ ∈ h such that m′ ✄ m.
So we choose such an m′. By Lemma 1.3 Hm′ ⊆ Hm, and, moreover, every history in
Hm′ is undivided from h at m. By the presenting a new proof makes histories divide
constraint, this means that:
(∀g ∈ Hm′)(Act(m, g) = Act(m,h)). (28)
By (27) and (28), this means that:
t1, . . . , tn ∈
⋂
g∈Hm′
Act(m, g). (29)
Note that it follows from m′✄m and the expansion of presented proofs constraint that⋂
g∈Hm′
Act(m, g) ⊆ Actm′ , so that we must have, by (29), that:
t1, . . . , tn ∈ Actm′ . (30)
Next, it follows from (25) by the monotonicity of evidence that:
B1 ∈ E(m
′, t1), . . . , Bn ∈ E(m
′, tn), (31)
and it follows from m′ ✄m by the future always matters constraint and the inclusion
R ⊆ Re that Re(m,m′). From the latter fact we get, by (26) and transitivity of Re
that:
(∀m0 ∈ Tree)(∀h0 ∈ Hm0)(Re(m
′,m0)⇒M,m0, h0 |= B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bn). (32)
In their turn, (31) and (32) yield that:
M,m′ |= t1 :B1 ∧ . . . ∧ tn :Bn, (33)
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by the definition of satisfaction relation. Adding this up with (30) we get that:
M,m′, h |= Proven(t1, B1) ∧ . . . ∧ Prove(tn, Bn). (34)
Finally, by m′ ✄m and the future always matters constraint, we get that R(m,m′),
whence, by transitivity of R and (23), we obtain that:
M,m′, h |= KA. (35)
Taken together, (34) and (35) contradict the assumed validity of
KA → (¬Proven(t1, B1) ∨ . . . ∨ ¬Proven(tn, Bn)), which shows that (22) cannot be
true for any moment-history pair in any CS-normal jstit model.
Before treating completeness, we make some elementary observations about prov-
ability in the systems of the form Π(CS). We first state some theorems and derivable
rules of Π.
Lemma 3. Let A ∈ FormAg, j, i1, . . . , in ∈ Ag and t ∈ Pol. Then all of the following
theorems and derived rules are provable in Π:
KA→ ✷A (T0)
From A infer ✷A (R’1)
From A infer [j]A (R’2)
t:A→ Kt:A (T1)
t:A→ ✷t:A (T2)
KA→ ✷KA (T3)
Proven(t, A)→ ✷Proven(t, A) (T4)
¬✷(Prove(i1, t, A) ∨ . . . ∨ Prove(in, t, A)) (T5)
Proof. (T0). We use the transitivity of implication w.r.t. the following set of formulas:
KA→ ✷K✷A (by (A8)) (36)
✷K✷A→ K✷A (by (A1)) (37)
K✷A→ ✷A (by (A7)) (38)
(R’1). From A we infer KA by (R2) and then use (T0) and modus ponens to get ✷A.
(R’2). From A we infer ✷A by (R’1) and then apply (A2) and modus ponens.
We pause to note that by (R’1) and (R’2) we know that every modality in the set
{✷} ∪ {[j] | j ∈ Ag} is an S5-modality.
(T1). We have both t:A →!t:(t:A) and !t:(t:A) → Kt:A by (A5) so that we get
(T1) by transitivity of implication.
(T2). By (T1) and (T0).
(T3). By KA→ KKA (a part of (A7)) and (T0).
(T4). By (B11) and (T0).
(T5). We first prove the theorem for n = 1. In this case, note that we have
✷Prove(i1, t, A)→ Prove(i1, t, A) by (A1) whence by contraposition we get
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¬Prove(i1, t, A)→ ¬✷Prove(i1, t, A). We also have Prove(i1, t, A)→ ¬✷Prove(i1, t, A)
by (B9). By classical propositional logic we get then:
(Prove(i1, t, A) ∨ ¬Prove(i1, t, A))→ ¬✷Prove(i1, t, A),
and, further ¬✷Prove(i1, t, A), as desired. We now turn to the general case and sketch
the derivation as follows:
¬Prove(i1, t, A)→ 〈i1〉(
∧
j∈Ag
¬Prove(j, t, A)) (by (B13)) (39)
〈i1〉(
∧
j∈Ag
¬Prove(j, t, A))→ 〈i1〉(
n∧
k=1
¬Prove(ik, t, A)) ([i1] is S5) (40)
¬Prove(i1, t, A)→ 〈i1〉(
n∧
k=1
¬Prove(ik, t, A)) (by (39) and (40)) (41)
[i1](
n∨
k=1
Prove(ik, t, A))→ Prove(i1, t, A) (by (41), contrap.) (42)
✷(
n∨
k=1
Prove(ik, t, A))→ Prove(i1, t, A) (by (42), (A2)) (43)
✷(
n∨
k=1
Prove(ik, t, A))→ ✷Prove(i1, t, A) (✷ is S5) (44)
From (44), (T5) follows by the case for n = 1 and classical propositional logic.
Our second point is that the rule (S4) can be substituted by an infinite array of
axiomatic schemes without affecting the set of provable formulas, which gives us, in
effect, an alternative axiomatization for the systems of the form Π(CS). More precisely,
the following lemma holds:
Lemma 4. Let CS be a constant specification. Consider the following axiomatic
scheme:
K(¬Proven(t1, B1) ∨ . . . ∨ ¬Proven(tn, Bn))→
→ (
∧
j∈Ag
¬Prove(j, t1, B1) ∨ . . . ∨
∧
j∈Ag
¬Prove(j, tn, Bn)) (AS4)
for arbitrary t1, . . . , tn ∈ Pol and B1, . . . , Bn ∈ FormAg. Let Π′(CS) be the ax-
iomatic system obtained from Π(CS) by replacing (S4) with (AS4). Then, for every
A ∈ FormAg, it is true that A is provable in Π(CS) iff A is provable in Π′(CS)
Proof. (⇐) Assume that t1, . . . , tn ∈ Pol and B1, . . . , Bn ∈ FormAg . Then, setting:
B := ¬Proven(t1, B1) ∨ . . . ∨ ¬Proven(tn, Bn),
it suffices to note that the respective instance of (AS4) is provable in Π(CS) by one
application of (S4) to KB → B, which itself is an axiom by (A7).
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(⇒). Assume that t1, . . . , tn ∈ Pol and B1, . . . , Bn ∈ FormAg. Then, let B be as
above and set:
C :=
∧
j∈Ag
¬Prove(j, t1, B1) ∨ . . . ∨
∧
j∈Ag
¬Prove(j, tn, Bn).
Then note that every transition from KD → B to KD → C according to (S4) can be
replaced with a proof in Π′(CS) sketched below:
KD→ B (premise) (45)
K(KD→ B) (by (45) and (R2)) (46)
KD→ KB (by (46), (A7), and (R1)) (47)
KB → C (by (AS4)) (48)
KD→ C (by (47), (48), and (A0)) (49)
We are now prepared to formulate our main result:
Theorem 2. Let Γ ⊆ FormAg and let CS be a constant specification. Then Γ is
CS-consistent iff it is satisfiable in a CS-normal jstit model iff it is satisfiable in a
unirelational CS-normal jstit model.
One part of the completeness results we have, of course, right away, as a consequence
of Theorem 1:
Corollary 1. Let Γ ⊆ FormAg and let CS be a constant specification. If Γ is satisfiable
in a CS-normal (unirelational) jstit model, then Γ is CS-consistent.
Proof. Let Γ ⊆ FormAg be satisfiable in a CS-normal jstit model M, either unire-
lational or not. Then for some (m,h) ∈ MH(M) we have M,m, h |= Γ. If Γ
were CS-inconsistent this would mean that for some A1, . . . , An ∈ Γ we would have
⊢CS (A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An)→ ⊥. By Theorem 1, this would mean that:
M,m, h |= (A1 ∧ . . . ∧An)→ ⊥,
whence clearlyM,m, h |= ⊥, which is impossible. Therefore, Γ must be CS-consistent.
4 The canonical model
We begin by fixing an arbitrary constant specification CS throughout the present
section. The main aim of the section is to prepare the proof of the inverse of Corollary
1. The method used is a variant of the canonical model technique, but, due to the
complexity of the case, we do not define our model in one sweeping definition. Rather,
we proceed piecewise, defining elements of the model one by one, and checking the
relevant constraints as soon, as we have got enough parts of the model in place. The
last subsection proves the truth lemma for the defined model. As we have already
indicated, the model to be built will be a normal unirelational jstit model, so that Re
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will be omitted, or, equivalently, assumed to coincide with R. It should also be noted
that our definitions of stit- and justifications-related components of the canonical model
are borrowed to the last letter from the construction of the canonical model for JA-
STIT given in [8]. Even though the basic building blocks for our current case are
somewhat different from those used for JA-STIT case, this does not affect the proofs
of the respective lemmas in the least. Therefore, we omit the proofs of almost every
lemma claimed in subsection 4.1 and replace them with the following table bringing
the lemmas in question into correspondence with the respective lemmas of [8] so that
the reader may look up the proofs whenever this is called for.
Numbering given in subsection 4.1 Reference to [8]
Lemma 8 Lemma 4
Lemma 9 Lemma 5
Lemma 10 Lemma 9
Lemma 11 Lemma 10
Lemma 12 Lemma 12
Lemma 16 Lemma 14
Lemma 17 Lemma 15
The canonical model to be constructed below will be a CS-normal jstit model named
MAg
CS
. The ultimate building blocks of MAg
CS
we will call elements. Before going on
with the definition of MAg
CS
, we define what these elements are and explore some of
their properties.
Definition 1. An element is a sequence of the form (Γ1, . . . ,Γn) for some n ∈ ω with
n ≥ 1 such that:
• For every k ≤ n, Γk is a CS-maxiconsistent subset of FormAg ;
• For every k < n, for all A ∈ FormAg, if KA ∈ Γk, then KA ∈ Γk+1;
• For every k < n, for all t ∈ Pol, A ∈ FormAg, and j ∈ Ag, if Prove(j, t, A) ∈ Γk,
then Proven(t, A) ∈ Γk+1.
We prove the following lemma:
Lemma 5. Whenever (Γ1, . . . ,Γn) is an element, there exists a Γn+1 ⊆ FormAg such
that the sequence (Γ1, . . . ,Γn+1) is also an element.
Proof. Assume (Γ1, . . . ,Γn) is an element and consider the following set:
∆ := {KA | KA ∈ Γn} ∪ {Proven(t, A) | (∃j ∈ Ag)(Prove(j, t, A) ∈ Γn)}.
We show that ∆ is CS-consistent. Of course, the set {KA | KA ∈ Γn} is CS-
consistent since it is a subset of Γn and the latter is assumed to be CS-consistent.
Further, if ∆ is CS-inconsistent, then, wlog, for some B1, . . . , Bk, C1, . . . , Cl ∈ FormAg,
t1, . . . , tl ∈ Ag, and j1, . . . , jl ∈ Ag such thatKB1, . . . ,KBk and Prove(j1, t1, C1), . . . , P rove(jl, tl, Cl)
are in Γn we will have:
⊢CS (KB1 ∧ . . . ∧KBr)→ (¬Proven(t1, C1) ∨ . . . ∨ ¬Proven(tl, Cl)),
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whence, by (A7):
⊢CS K(B1 ∧ . . . ∧Br)→ (¬Prove(t1, C1) ∨ . . . ∨ ¬Proven(tl, Cl)),
and further, by (S4):
⊢CS K(B1 ∧ . . . ∧Br)→ (
∧
j∈Ag
¬Prove(j, t1, C1) ∨ . . . ∨
∧
j∈Ag
¬Prove(j, tl, Cl)),
whence, by (A0) and (R1) we get that:
⊢CS K(B1 ∧ . . . ∧Br)→ (¬Prove(j1, t1, C1) ∨ . . . ∨ ¬Prove(jl, tl, Cl)).
The latter formula shows that Γn is CS-inconsistent which contradicts the assumption
that (Γ1, . . . ,Γn) is an element.
Therefore, ∆ must be CS-consistent, and is also extendable to a CS-maxiconsistent
Γn+1. By the choice of ∆, this means that (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γn+1) must be an element.
The structure of elements will be important in what follows. If ξ = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn) is
an element and an element τ is of the form (Γ1, . . . ,Γk) with k < n, we say that τ is a
proper initial segment of ξ. Moreover, if k = n− 1, then τ is the greatest proper initial
segment of ξ. We define n to be the length of ξ. Furthermore, we define that Γn is the
end element of ξ and write Γn = end(ξ).
We now define the canonical model using elements as our building blocks. We start
by defining the following relation ≡:
(Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γn+1) ≡ (∆1, . . . ,∆n,∆n+1)⇔ (Γ1 = ∆1& . . .&Γn = ∆n&
&(∀A ∈ FormAg)(✷A ∈ Γn+1 ⇒ A ∈ ∆n+1).
It is routine to check that ≡ is an equivalence relation given that ✷ is an S5 modal-
ity. The notation [(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)]≡ will denote the ≡-equivalence class generated by
(Γ1, . . . ,Γn). Since all the elements inside a given ≡-equvalence class are of the same
length, we may extend the notion of length to these classes setting that the length of
[(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)]≡ also equals n.
The next two lemmas will be repeatedly used in what follows:
Lemma 6. Let (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ) be an element, let ∆ ⊆ FormAg be CS-maxiconsistent
and let:
{✷A | ✷A ∈ Γ} ⊆ ∆.
Then (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆) is also an element, and, moreover:
(Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ) ≡ (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆).
Proof. We first show that (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆) is an element. Indeed, if KA ∈ Γn, then
KA ∈ Γ by definition of an element. But then ✷KA ∈ Γ by (T2) and CS-maxiconsistency
of Γ, whence ✷KA ∈ ∆. By (A1) and CS-maxiconsistency of ∆ we get then KA ∈ ∆.
Similarly, if Prove(j, t, A) ∈ Γn, then Proven(t, A) ∈ Γ by definition of an ele-
ment. But then ✷Proven(t, A) ∈ Γ by (T4) and CS-maxiconsistency of Γ, whence
✷Proven(t, A) ∈ ∆.
Given the inclusion {✷A | ✷A ∈ Γ} ⊆ ∆, the other part of the lemma is straight-
forward.
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Lemma 7. Let ξ be an element and let A ∈ FormAg. Then the following statements
hold:
1. A ∈
⋂
τ≡ξ end(τ)⇔ ✷A ∈ end(ξ)⇔ ✷A ∈
⋂
τ≡ξ end(τ).
2. If ⊢CS A→ ✷A, then A ∈ end(ξ)⇔ A ∈
⋂
τ≡ξ end(τ)⇔ ✷A ∈
⋂
τ≡ξ end(τ).
Proof. (Part 1) If ✷A ∈
⋂
τ≡ξ end(τ), then, of course, ✷A ∈ end(ξ), whence, by
definition of ≡ we get that A ∈
⋂
τ≡ξ end(τ). On the other hand, if A ∈
⋂
τ≡ξ end(τ),
then choose an arbitrary τ such that τ ≡ ξ. If ✷A ∈ end(τ), then we are done.
Otherwise, we can obtain a contradiction as follows. Consider the set:
Γ = {✷B | ✷B ∈ end(τ)} ∪ {¬A}.
If Γ were CS-inconsistent, then we would have:
⊢CS (✷B1 ∧ . . . ∧ ✷Bn)→ A
for some ✷B1, . . . ,✷Bn ∈ end(τ), whence by S5 reasoning for ✷ we would also have
that:
⊢CS (✷B1 ∧ . . . ∧✷Bn)→ ✷A.
By CS-maxiconsistency of end(τ) it would follow then that ✷A ∈ end(τ), contrary
to our assumption. Therefore, Γ is CS-consistent and we can extend it to a CS-
maxiconsistent ∆. Consider the inner structure of τ . We must have τ = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn, end(τ))
for appropriate n ≥ 0 and Γ1, . . . ,Γn ⊆ FormAg. But then, by Lemma 6, we must also
have that (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆) is an element, and, moreover, that (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆) ≡ τ ≡ ξ.
But then, note that by Γ ⊆ ∆ we have ¬A ∈ ∆, whence by CS-consistency A /∈ ∆
in contradiction with our assumption that A ∈
⋂
τ≡ξ end(τ). This contradiction
shows that for no τ ≡ ξ can we have ✷A /∈ end(τ) so that we must end up hav-
ing ✷A ∈
⋂
τ≡ξ end(τ).
(Part 2). If ⊢CS A→ ✷A then, by (A1) and CS-maxiconsistency of end(ξ), we will
have ✷A ∈ end(ξ)⇔ A ∈ end(ξ), and the rest follows by Part 1.
We now proceed to definitions of components for the canonical model.
4.1 Stit and justification components
The first two components of the canonical model MAg
CS
are as follows:
• Tree = {†} ∪ {([ξ]≡, n) | n ∈ ω, ξ is an element}. Thus the elements of Tree,
with the exception of the special moment †, are ≡-equivalence classes of elements
coupled with natural numbers. Such moments we will call standard moments,
and the left projection of a standard moment m we will call its core (and write
−→m), while the right projection of such moment we will call its height (and write
|m|). In this way, we get the equality m = (−→m, |m|) for every standard m ∈ Tree.
We further define that the length of a standard moment m is the length of its
core. For the sake of completeness, we extend the above notions to † setting both
length and height of this moment to 0 and defining that
−→
† = †.
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• We set that (∀m ∈ Tree \ {†})(† ✁m&m ⋪ †). We further set that for any two
standard moments m and m′, we have that m ✁m′ iff either (1) there exists a
ξ ∈ −→m such that for every τ ∈
−→
m′, ξ is a proper initial segment of τ , or (2) −→m =
−→
m′
and |m′| < |m|. The relation ✂ is then defined as the reflexive companion to ✁.
With this settings, we claim that the restraints imposed by our semantics on Tree
and ✂ are satisfied:
Lemma 8. The relation ✂, as defined above, is a partial order on Tree, which satisfies
both historical connection and no backward branching constraints.
Before we move on to the other components of the canonical modelM to be defined
in this section, we formulate some important facts about the structure of Hist(MAg
CS
)
as induced by the above-defined Tree and ✂. We start by defining basic sequences of
elements. A basic sequence of elements is a set of elements of the form {ξ1, . . . , ξn, . . . , }
such that for every n ≥ 1:
• ξn is of length n;
• ξn is the greatest proper initial segment of ξn+1.
Basic sequences will be denoted by capital Latin letters S, T , and U with subscripts
and superscripts when needed. Every given basic sequence S induces the following
[S] ⊆ Tree:
[S] = {†} ∪
⋃
n∈ω
{([ξn]≡, k) | k ∈ ω}.
It is immediate that every basic sequence S induces a unique [S] ⊆ Tree in this way.
It is, perhaps, less immediate that the mapping S 7→ [S] is injective:
Lemma 9. Let S, T be basic sequences of elements. Then:
[S] = [T ]⇔ S = T.
Another striking fact is that basic sequences can be used to characterizeHist(MAg
CS
)
through this injection:
Lemma 10. The following statements hold:
1. If S = {ξ1, . . . , ξn, . . . , } is a basic sequence, then [S] ∈ Hist(M
Ag
CS
), and the
following presentation gives [S] in the ✂-ascending order:
†, . . . , ([ξ1]≡, k), . . . , ([ξ1]≡, 0), . . . , ([ξn]≡, k), . . . , ([ξn]≡, 0), . . . ,
2. Hist(MAg
CS
) = {[S] | S is a basic sequence}.
It follows from Lemmas 9 and 10 that not only every basic sequence generates a
unique h ∈ Hist(MAg
CS
), but also for every h ∈ Hist(MAg
CS
) there exists a unique basic
sequence S such that h = [S]. We will denote this unique S for a given h by ]h[. It is
immediate from Lemmas 9 and 10 that for every h ∈ Hist(MAg
CS
), h = [(]h[)]. Likewise,
for every basic sequence S, we have S =]([S])[. As a further useful piece of notation, we
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introduce the notion of intersection of a standard moment m with a history h ∈ Hm.
Assume that m is of the length n and that ]h[= {ξ1, . . . , ξn, . . . , }. Then m must be of
the form ([ξn]≡, k) for some k ∈ ω, and we will also have
−→m∩]h[= {ξn}. We now define
the only member of the latter singleton as the result m⊓h of the intersection of m and
h, setting m ⊓ h = ξn. It can be shown that for any element ξ in the core of a given
standard moment m there exists an h ∈ Hm such that ξ = m ⊓ h:
Lemma 11. Let (Γ1, . . . ,Γk) be an element. Then, for every n ∈ ω there is at least
one history h ∈ H([(Γ1,...,Γk)]≡,n) such that ([(Γ1, . . . ,Γk)]≡, n) ⊓ h = (Γ1, . . . ,Γk).
An immediate but important corollary of Lemma 11 is that the core of a given
moment m is exactly the set of m’s intersections with the histories passing through m:
Corollary 2. Let m ∈ Tree. Then {ξ | ξ ∈ −→m} = {m ⊓ h | h ∈ Hm}.
We offer some general remarks on what we have shown thus far. Lemma 10 shows
that every history in the canonical model has a uniform order structure, namely, it
consists of † followed by ω copies of the set of negative integers. Another general
observation is that histories in MAg
CS
can only branch off at moments of height 0, so
that at moments of other heights all the histories remain undivided. This last fact does
not follow from the lemmas proved thus far but it can be proved in the same way as
we have proved the similar fact in [8, Corollary 3].
We now define the choice function for our canonical model:
• Choicemj (h) = {h
′ ∈ Hm | (∀A ∈ Form)([j]A ∈ end(h⊓m)⇒ A ∈ end(h
′⊓m))},
if m 6= † and |m| = 0;
• Choicemj = Hm, otherwise.
Since for every j ∈ Ag, [j] is an S5-modality, Choice induces a partition on Hm for
every given m ∈ Tree. We claim that the choice function verifies the relevant semantic
constraints:
Lemma 12. The tuple 〈Tree,✂, Choice〉, as defined above, verifies both independence
of agents and no choice between undivided histories constraints.
The next two lemmas can be viewed as ‘stit versions’ of Lemmas 6 and 7.
Lemma 13. Let j ∈ Ag, let (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ) be an element, let ∆ ⊆ FormAg be CS-
maxiconsistent and let:
{[j]A | [j]A ∈ Γ} ⊆ ∆.
Then (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆) is also an element, and for m = ((Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ)≡, 0), whenever
m ⊓ h = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ), there exists a g ∈ Choicemj (h) such that:
(Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆) = m ⊓ g.
Proof. First of all, note that whenever✷A ∈ Γ we have, in virtue of CS-maxiconsistency
of Γ, that ✷✷A ∈ Γ (by (A1)) and, further, that [j]✷A ∈ Γ (by (A2)). Therefore, we
must have [j]✷A ∈ ∆ and in view of CS-maxiconsistency of ∆ and (A1) we will also have
✷A ∈ ∆. Thus we have established that {✷A | ✷A ∈ Γ} ⊆ ∆ and it follows, by Lemma
6, that (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆) is an element and that (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆) ∈
−→m. Now, if h is chosen
as in the lemma, use Lemma 11 to pick a g ∈ Hm such that (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆) = m ⊓ g
holds. Recall that we have |m| = 0. By the construction of ∆ and (A1) we must then
have g ∈ Choicemj (h).
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Before moving on with the lemmas, we introduce two further notations, which are
similar to the notations we used for Act, but refer to the inner structures of MAg
CS
:
endm =
⋂
h∈Hm
end(m ⊓ h); end(m,h,j) =
⋂
g∈Choicemj (h)
end(m ⊓ g).
Lemma 14. Let m ∈ Tree be such that |m| = 0, and let A ∈ FormAg. Then:
A ∈ end(m,h,j) ⇔ [j]A ∈ end(m ⊓ h)⇔ [j]A ∈ end(m,h,j).
Proof. If [j]A ∈ end(m,h,j), then, by h ∈ Choice
m
j (h), [j]A ∈ end(m ⊓ h), whence, by
|m| = 0 we get that A ∈ end(m,h,j). On the other hand, if A ∈ end(m,h,j), then choose
an arbitrary g ∈ Choicemj (h). If [j]A ∈ m ⊓ g, then we are done. Otherwise, we can
obtain a contradiction as follows. Consider the set
Γ = {[j]B | [j]B ∈ end(m ⊓ g)} ∪ {¬A}.
If Γ were CS-inconsistent, then we would have:
⊢CS ([j]B1 ∧ . . . ∧ [j]Bn)→ A,
for some [j]B1, . . . , [j]Bn ∈ end(m ⊓ g), whence by S5 reasoning for [j] we would also
have that:
⊢CS ([j]B1 ∧ . . . ∧ [j]Bn)→ [j]A.
By CS-maxiconsistency of end(m ⊓ g) it would follow then that [j]A ∈ end(m ⊓ g),
contrary to our assumption. Therefore, Γ is CS-consistent and we can extend it
to a CS-maxiconsistent ∆. Consider the inner structure of m ⊓ g. We must have
m ⊓ g = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn, end(m ⊓ g)) for appropriate n ≥ 0 and Γ1, . . . ,Γn ⊆ Form
Ag.
But then, by Lemma 13, we must also have that (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆) is an element, and,
moreover, that (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆) = m⊓ h′ for some h′ ∈ Choicemj (g) = Choice
m
j (h) (the
latter equality obtains by g ∈ Choicemj (h)). But then, note that by Γ ⊆ ∆ we have
¬A ∈ ∆, whence by CS-consistency A /∈ ∆ = end(m ⊓ h′) in contradiction with our
assumption that A ∈ end(m,h,j). This contradiction shows that for no g ∈ Choice
m
j (h)
can we have [j]A /∈ end(τ) so that we must end up having [j]A ∈ end(m,h,j).
We sum up the implications of the above lemmas for our modalities as follows:
Corollary 3. Let m ∈ Tree, h ∈ Hm, A ∈ FormAg, t ∈ Pol, and j ∈ Ag. Then:
1. α ∈ end(m ⊓ h)⇔ α ∈ endm, for all α ∈ {✷A, t:A,KA,Proven(t, A)};
2. α ∈ end(m ⊓ h)⇔ α ∈ end(m,h,j), for all α ∈ {[j]A,Prove(j, t, A)}.
Proof. Part 1 we get by (A1), (T2)–(T4), Lemma 7.2, and Corollary 2. Part 2 we get
by (A1), (B9), CS-maxiconsistency of end sets of elements, and Lemma 14.
Turning to the justifications-related components, we first define R as follows:
• R(([(Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ)]≡, k),m
′)⇔
⇔ (m′ 6= †)&(∀A ∈ FormAg)(KA ∈ Γ⇒ KA ∈ endm′);
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• R(†,m), for all m ∈ Tree.
Now, for the definition of E :
• For all t ∈ Pol: E(†, t) = {A ∈ FormAg |⊢ t:A};
• For all t ∈ Pol and m 6= †: (∀A ∈ FormAg)(A ∈ E(m, t)⇔ t:A ∈ endm).
We start by mentioning a straightforward corollary to the above definition:
Lemma 15. For allm ∈ Tree and t ∈ Pol it is true that {A ∈ FormAg |⊢ t:A} ⊆ E(m, t).
Proof. This holds simply by the definition of E when m = †. If m 6= †, then, for every
ξ ∈ −→m, end(ξ) is a maxiconsistent subset of FormAg and must contain every provable
formula.
Note that it follows from Lemma 15, that the above-defined function E satisfies
the CS-normality condition on jstit models. We now mention the respective adequacy
claims:
Lemma 16. The relation R, as defined above, is a preorder on Tree, and, together
with ✂, verifies the future always matters constraint.
Lemma 17. The function E, as defined above, satisfies both monotonicity of evidence
and evidence closure properties.
4.2 Act and V
It remains to define Act and V for our canonical model, and we define them as
follows:
• (m,h) ∈ V (p)⇔ p ∈ end(m ⊓ h), for all p ∈ V ar;
• Act(†, h) = ∅ for all h ∈ Hist(M);
• Act(m,h) = {t ∈ Pol | (∃A ∈ FormAg , j ∈ Ag)(Proven(t, A) ∈ end(m⊓h)∨Prove(j, t, A) ∈ end(m⊓h))},
if m 6= †, |m| = 0 and h ∈ Hm;
• Act(m,h) = {t ∈ Pol | (∃A ∈ FormAg)(Proven(t, A) ∈ end(m ⊓ g))}, if m 6= †,
|m| > 0 and h ∈ Hm
Since in the definition of Act we have used the proving modalities not available in
JA-STIT, we can no longer rely on constructions carried over for the canonical model
of [8].
We first draw some of the immediate consequences of the above definitions:
Lemma 18. Assume that m ∈ Tree \ {†}, h ∈ Hm, and t ∈ Pol. Then the following
statements are true:
1. (∃A ∈ FormAg)(Proven(t, A) ∈ end(m ⊓ h))⇔ t ∈ Actm;
2. If |m| > 0 and h, h′ ∈ Hm, then Act(m,h) = Act(m,h′);
3. If h, h′ ∈ Hm and m ⊓ h = m ⊓ h′, then Act(m,h) = Act(m,h′).
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Proof. (Part 1). Assume that for someA ∈ FormAg we have Proven(t, A) ∈ end(m⊓h).
Then, by Corollary 3.1, we must also have Proven(t, A) ∈ endm whence, by defini-
tion of Act, it follows that t ∈ Actm. In the other direction, let t ∈ Actm. If for some
g ∈ Hm and some A ∈ FormAg we have Proven(t, A) ∈ end(m⊓g), then, by Corollary
3.1, we must also have Proven(t, A) ∈ endm, whence also Proven(t, A) ∈ end(m ⊓ h).
Otherwise, we obtain a contradiction.
Indeed, if for no g ∈ Hm and A ∈ FormAg we have Proven(t, A) ∈ end(m ⊓ g),
then, by definition of Act, for every g ∈ Hm there must be an Ag ∈ FormAg and
a jg ∈ Ag such that Prove(jg, t, Ag) ∈ end(m ⊓ g). Now, consider Ah. We have
Prove(jh, t, Ah) ∈ end(m⊓h), therefore, by (B9) and CS-maxiconsistency of end(m⊓h),
we must also have t:Ah ∈ end(m ⊓ h). It follows by Lemma 3.1, that t:Ah ∈ endm.
Therefore, given the CS-maxiconsistency of end sets in elements, we must have Prove(jg , t, Ag)∧t:Ah ∈ endm.
By (B10), we further get that Prove(jg , t, Ah) ∈ endm. Note that {jg | g ∈ Hm} ⊆ Ag
and hence must be finite. Therefore
∨
g∈Hm
(Prove(jg , t, Ah)) is in fact a finite disjunc-
tion, and, again using CS-maxiconsistency of of end sets in elements, we obtain that∨
g∈Hm
Prove(jg , t, Ah) ∈ endm, whence, by Lemma 7.1 and Corollary 2, it follows
that ✷(
∨
g∈Hm
(Prove(jg , t, Ah)) ∈ end(m ⊓ h). By (T5), the latter is in contradiction
with CS-maxiconsistency of end(m ⊓ h), which finishes the proof of Part 1.
(Part 2). In the assumptions of this part, we get, by Corollary 3.1, that:
t ∈ Act(m,h)⇔ (∃A ∈ FormAg)(Proven(t, A) ∈ end(m ⊓ h))
⇔ (∃A ∈ FormAg)(Proven(t, A) ∈ endm)
⇔ (∃A ∈ FormAg)(Proven(t, A) ∈ end(m ⊓ h′))
⇔ t ∈ Act(m,h′),
for an arbitrary t ∈ Pol.
(Part 3). Note that Act(m,h) and Act(m,h′) are fully determined by end(m⊓h) and
end(m⊓h′), respectively, and that, by our assumptions, we must have end(m⊓h) = end(m⊓h′).
We now check that the remaining semantic constraints on jstit models are satisfied:
Lemma 19. MAg
CS
satisfies the constraints as to the expransion of presented proofs, no
new proofs guaranteed, presenting a new proof makes histories divide, and epistemic
transparency of presented proofs.
Proof. We consider the expansion of presented proofs first. Let m′ ✁m and let
h ∈ Hm. If m′ = †, then we have Act(†, h) = ∅, so that the expansion of presented
proofs holds. If m′ 6= †, then m is also standard. Consider then m′ ⊓ h and m ⊓ h.
Both these elements must be in the basic sequence ]h[, therefore, one of them must be
an initial segment of another. By m′✁m we know that m′ ⊓h must be a proper initial
segment ofm⊓h. So we may assume thatm′⊓h = (Γ1, . . . ,Γk) andm⊓h = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn)
for some appropriate Γ1, . . . ,Γn ⊆ FormAg and n > k. Now, if t ∈ Act(m′, h), then
for some A ∈ FormAg we must have either that Prove(j, t, A) ∈ end(m′ ⊓ h) = Γk for
some j ∈ Ag, or that Proven(t, A) ∈ end(m′ ⊓ h). In the latter case we will also have
KProven(t, A) ∈ end(m′ ⊓ h) by (B11) and CS-maxiconsistency of Γk. Then, since
(Γ1, . . . ,Γn) is an element, we must have KProven(t, A) ∈ Γn, whence, by (A7) and
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CS-maxiconsistency of Γn, we further obtain that Proven(t, A) ∈ Γn = end(m ⊓ h).
Hence we must have t ∈ Act(m,h).
In the former case we also invoke the fact that (Γ1, . . . ,Γn) is an element, which in
this case directly entails that Proven(t, A) ∈ Γk+1 and, given that k + 1 ≤ n, the rest
is the same as in the previous case.
We consider next the no new proofs guaranteed constraint. Let m ∈ Tree.
If m = †, then Actm =
⋃
m′✁m,h∈Hm
(Act(m′, h)) = ∅ and the constraint is trivially
satisfied. Assume that m 6= † and that t ∈ Actm and choose an arbitrary h ∈ Hm.
Consider m ⊓ h, say m ⊓ h = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn). We get then that m = ([(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)]≡, k)
for some k ∈ ω. By Lemma 18.1, we further obtain that for some A ∈ FormAg we will
have Proven(t, A) ∈ Γn. Now, consider m′ = ([(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)]≡, k + 1). We clearly have
m′✁m, therefore, by Lemma 1.3 h ∈ Hm′ . Moreover, it is clear that m′⊓h also equals
(Γ1, . . . ,Γn), so that we get Proven(t, A) ∈ Γn = end(m′ ⊓ h), whence t ∈ Act(m′, h)
as desired.
We turn next to the presenting a new proof makes histories divide constraint.
Consider m,m′ ∈ Tree such that m✁m′ and arbitrary h, h′ ∈ Hm′ . We immediately
get then that h, h′ ∈ Hm. If m = †, then the constraint is verified trivially. If m 6= †,
then we have two cases to consider:
Case 1. −→m =
−→
m′ and |m| > |m′|. Then we must have |m| > 0, and by Lemma 18.2
it follows that in this case for all h, h′ ∈ Hm we will have Act(m,h) = Act(m,h′) so
that the constraint is verified.
Case 2. There is a ξ ∈ −→m such that ξ is a proper initial segment of every τ ∈
−→
m′.
Consider then m′ ⊓ h and m′ ⊓ h′. These are elements in
−→
m′, and hence ξ is a proper
initial segment of both m′ ⊓h and m′ ⊓h′. Moreover, we know that m⊓h is also in ]h[
and hence must be an initial segment of m′ ⊓ h of the length equal to the length of ξ.
The same holds for m⊓h′ and m′ ⊓h′, respectively. It follows that m⊓h = m⊓h′ = ξ
whence, by Lemma 18.3, we immediately get Act(m,h) = Act(m,h′).
It remains to check the epistemic transparency of presented proofs constraint.
Assume that m,m′ ∈ Tree are such that R(m,m′). If we have m = †, then, by defi-
nition, we must have Actm = ∅, and the constraint is verified in a trivial way. If, on
the other hand, m 6= †, then, by R(m,m′), we must also have m′ 6= †. Assume that
t ∈ Actm. Then, by Lemma 18.1, we also have Proven(t, A) ∈ end(m ⊓ h) for some
A ∈ FormAg. ByR(m,m′) and Corollary 2, it follows that Proven(t, A) ∈
⋂
g∈Hm′
end(m⊓g),
whence, again by Lemma 18.1, we know that t ∈ Actm′ .
4.3 The truth lemma
It follows from Lemmas 8, 12, 17, and 19, that our above-defined canonical model
MAg
CS
is a unirelational jstit model for Ag. By Lemma 15 we know that MAg
CS
is CS-
normal. Now we need to supply a truth lemma:
Lemma 20. Let A ∈ Form, let m ∈ Tree \ {†} be such that |m| = 0, and let h ∈ Hm.
Then:
MAg
CS
,m, h |= A⇔ A ∈ end(m ⊓ h).
Proof. As is usual, we prove the lemma by induction on the construction of A. The
basis of induction with A = p ∈ V ar we have by definition of V , whereas Boolean cases
for the induction step are trivial. The cases for A being of the form ✷B, [j]B, KB or
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t:B for some j ∈ Ag and t ∈ Pol, are treated exactly as for JA-STIT (see [8], although
Corollary 3 already provides a clear hint for the proof of cases A = ✷B, [j]B). We
consider the cases for the two proving modalities:
Case 1. A = Proven(t, B) for some t ∈ Pol. If Proven(t, B) ∈ end(m ⊓ h), then,
by Lemma 18.1, we must have t ∈ Actm. Furthermore, by CS-maxiconsistency of
end(m ⊓ h) and (B11), we must also have t:B ∈ end(m ⊓ h), whence by the induction
case for t:B it follows that MAg
CS
,m, h |= t:B. Summing this up with t ∈ Actm, we get
that MAg
CS
,m, h |= Proven(t, B).
In the other direction, assume that Proven(t, B) /∈ end(m ⊓ h). We have then two
subcases to consider:
Case 1.1. t:B /∈ end(m ⊓ h). Then, by the induction case for t:B it follows
that MAg
CS
,m, h 6|= t:B, whence, by definition of satisfaction relation, we get that
MAg
CS
,m, h 6|= Proven(t, B).
Case 1.2. t:B ∈ end(m ⊓ h). Now, if t ∈ Actm, then, by Lemma 18.1, there
must be some C ∈ FormAg such that Proven(t, C) ∈ end(m ⊓ h). By (B12) and
CS-maxiconsistency of end(m ⊓ h), this means that Proven(t, B) ∈ end(m ⊓ h) con-
trary to our assumption. The obtained contradiction shows that t /∈ Actm, whence
MAg
CS
,m, h 6|= Proven(t, B), as desired.
Case 2. A = Prove(j, t, B) for some j ∈ Ag and t ∈ Pol. If Prove(j, t, B) ∈ end(m⊓h),
then, by CS-maxiconsistency of end(m ⊓ h) and (B9), we must have
t:B,¬✷Prove(j, t, B),¬Proven(t, B) ∈ end(m ⊓ h). (50)
This immediately gives us, by the induction case for t:B, that:
MAg
CS
,m, h |= t:B. (51)
Moreover, we can infer by Corollary 3.2 that Prove(j, t, B) ∈ end(m,h,j), whence it
follows, by |m| = 0 and the definition of Act, that:
t ∈ Act(m,h,j). (52)
Next, we observe that ¬✷Prove(j, t, B) ∈ end(m⊓h) yields, by CS-maxiconsistency of
end(m ⊓ h), that ✷Prove(j, t, B) /∈ end(m ⊓ h), whence, by Lemma 7.1 and Corollary
2 we get that Prove(j, t, B) /∈ endm. Therefore, we choose a g ∈ Hm such that
Prove(j, t, B) /∈ end(m ⊓ g). By CS-maxiconsistency of end(m ⊓ g) and (B13) we get
that:
〈j〉
∧
i∈Ag
¬Prove(i, t, B) ∈ end(m ⊓ g). (53)
It follows by Lemma 14, that we can choose a g′ ∈ Choicemj (g) ⊆ Hm such that:
∧
i∈Ag
¬Prove(i, t, B) ∈ end(m ⊓ g′). (54)
We now show that assuming t ∈ Act(m, g′) leads to a contradiction. Indeed, if
t ∈ Act(m, g′), then we would have either Prove(i, t, C) or Proven(t, C) in end(m⊓g′)
for some i ∈ Ag and C ∈ FormAg . In the former case note that, by Corollary 3.1,
it would follow from (50) that t:B ∈ end(m ⊓ g′), whence by CS-maxiconsistency of
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end(m ⊓ g′) and (B10) we would further obtain that Prove(i, t, B) ∈ end(m ⊓ g′),
contrary to (54). In the latter case we would have Proven(t, C) ∈ end(m ⊓ h), by
g′, h ∈ Hm, and Corollary 3.1. In virtue of CS-maxiconsistency of end(m ⊓ h), (51),
and (B12) this would further imply that Proven(t, B) ∈ end(m ⊓ h), in contradiction
with (50). The obtained contradiction shows that we must have:
t /∈ Act(m, g′). (55)
Adding up (51), (52), and (55), yields that MAg
CS
,m, h |= Prove(j, t, B).
In the other direction, assume that Prove(j, t, B) /∈ end(m⊓h). We have to consider
three further subcases.
Case 2.1. t:B /∈ end(m ⊓ h). Then, by induction case for t:B, it follows that
MAg
CS
,m, h 6|= t:B, whence by (B9) we get that MAg
CS
,m, h 6|= Prove(j, t, B).
Case 2.2. t:B,Proven(t, B) ∈ end(m ⊓ h). Then it follows, by Case 1, that
MAg
CS
,m, h |= Proven(t, B), whence, again by (B9), we get thatMAg
CS
,m, h 6|= Prove(j, t, B).
Case 2.3. t:B,¬Proven(t, B) ∈ end(m ⊓ h). Then, by Corollary 3.1 and CS-
maxiconsistency of end(m ⊓ h), it follows that t:B ∈ endm. Now, observe that
Prove(j, t, B) /∈ end(m ⊓ h) implies, by CS-maxiconsistency of end(m ⊓ h) and (B13),
that:
〈j〉
∧
i∈Ag
¬Prove(i, t, B) ∈ end(m ⊓ h). (56)
It follows by Lemma 14, that we can choose a g ∈ Choicemj (h) such that:
∧
i∈Ag
¬Prove(i, t, B) ∈ end(m ⊓ g). (57)
We now show that assuming t ∈ Act(m, g) leads to a contradiction. Indeed, if t ∈ Act(m, g),
then we would have either Prove(i, t, C) or Proven(t, C) in end(m⊓g) for some i ∈ Ag
and C ∈ FormAg. In the former case note that we also have t:B ∈ end(m ⊓ g),
whence by CS-maxiconsistency of end(m ⊓ g) and (B10) we would further obtain
that Prove(i, t, B) ∈ end(m ⊓ g′), contrary to (57). In the latter case, again using
t:B ∈ end(m ⊓ g), we would have Proven(t, B) ∈ end(m ⊓ g), by CS-maxiconsistency
of end(m⊓g) and (B12), which, by Corollary 3.1 and the fact that g ∈ Hm would mean
that Proven(t, B) ∈ end(m ⊓ h), making end(m ⊓ h) CS-inconsistent. The obtained
contradiction shows that we must have:
t /∈ Act(m, g), (58)
and since g ∈ Choicemj (h), this immediately implies that M
Ag
CS
,m, h 6|= Prove(j, t, B),
as desired.
This finishes the list of the modal induction cases at hand, and thus the proof of
our truth lemma is complete.
5 The main result and conclusions
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 2. The proof proceeds as follows. One
direction of the theorem was proved as Corollary 1. In the other direction, assume that
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Γ ⊆ FormAg is CS-consistent. Then Γ can be extended to a CS-maxiconsistent ∆.
But then considerMAg
CS
= 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R, E , V 〉, the canonical model defined
in Section 4. It is clear that (∆) is an element, therefore m = ([(∆)]≡, 0) ∈ Tree. By
Lemma 11, there is a history h ∈ Hm such that (∆) = ([(∆)]≡, 0) ⊓ h. For this h, we
will also have ∆ = end(([(∆)]≡, 0) ⊓ h). By Lemma 20, we therefore get that:
M, ([(∆)]≡, 0), h |= ∆ ⊇ Γ,
and thus Γ is shown to be satisfiable in a CS-normal jstit unirelational model, hence
in a normal jstit model.
Remark. Note that the canonical model used in this proof is universal in the sense
that it satisfies every subset of FormAg which is CS-consistent.
As an obvious corollary of Theorem 2 we get the compactness property.
Thus, building up on an earlier work on justification stit formalisms, we have defined
the explicit fragment of basic jstit logic introduced in [9]. For this logic we have
presented a strongly complete axiomatization which is stable relative to extensions with
constant specifications. This result is similar to the completeness theorem obtained
earlier for JA-STIT in [8] and also borrows from this paper some techniques and results
related to the construction of canonical model. We also note that Proposition 1 proven
above in Section 2 shows that explicit jstit logic, just like JA-STIT, can distinguish
between the class of models with a discrete temporal substructure and the general
class of models, even though it apparently has less expressive powers. We observe
that the formula A used in the proof of Proposition 1 is clearly related to the formula
K(¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey) → (¬Ex ∨ Ey) used to prove a similar proposition for JA-STIT in
[8]. The latter formula was shown to admit of an easy generalization which led to an
axiomatization of JA-STIT over the class of jstit models based on discrete time. It
would be natural to look for an axiomatization of explicit jstit logic over the same class
of models. However, this time the reduced expressive power of explicit jstit logic may
actually prove to be an obstacle, since the generalization pattern which we applied in
the case of JA-STIT does not seem to work in the case of explicit jstit logic.
Another natural, but even more uphill, task for the future research would be to
try and attempt an axiomatization of full basic jstit logic now that we have positive
experience with axiomatizations of both its implicit and its explicit fragment.
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